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CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY AMONG JOINT
TORTFEASORS IN KENTUCKY'
Contribution2 and indemnity3 are similar yet distinct actions.
They are similar in that each involves controversies between parties
admittedly liable for damages to a third party; they are distinct in
that the measure of damages is determined in contribution by pro-
rating the injured party's damages between the torffeasors4 while it
is determined in indemnity by shifting the entire loss from one tort-
feasor to the other.5 The distinction may be pointed up by consider-
ing the following situation. Suppose C recovered a $10,000 judg-
ment against joint torifeasors A and B that was satisfied by A alone.
If A's subsequent action against B was in conrtibution, his measure
of damages would be $5,000; if in indemnity, his measure of dam-
ages would be $10,000. Despite this important distinction, the two
actions are sometimes confused,6 and indemnity has been allowed
under the name of contribution7 while contribution has been allowed
where indemnity was the apparent remedy.8 The purpose of this
1"Joint tortfeasors" is used in this note to mean two or more tortfeasors
whose liability for damages to a third person arose out of the same occurrence.
2 "Contribution' is . . . the payment by each tortfeasor of his proportionate
share of the plaintiff's damages to any other tortfeasor who has paid more than
his proportionate part." Hodges, "Contribution and Indemnity Among Tort-
feasors' 23 Texas L. Rev. 150 (1947).
3 "Indemnity' is . .. the payment of all of plaintiffs damages by one tort-
feasor to another tortfeasor who had paid it to the plaintiff." Hodges, supra note
2, at 151.
4 Campbellsville Lumber Co. v. Lawrence, 268 S.W.12d 655 (Ky. 1954)-
Louisville Ry. v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 256 Ky. 827, 77 S.W.2d
36 (1934); Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Burge 245 Ky. 631, 54 S.W.2d 16(1932) (dictum); Prosser, Torts § 46, at 249 (2d ed. 1955).
5 Brown Hotel Co. v. Pittsburgh Fuel Co., 311 Ky. 896, 224 S.W.2d 165
(1949) (dictum); City of Georgetown v. Cantrill, 158 Ky. 378, 164 S.W. 929(1914); Bd. of Councilmen of City of Harrodsburg v. Vanardsdall, 148 Ky. 507,
147 S.W. 1 (1912); Blocker v. City of Owensboro, 129 Ky. 75, 110 S.W. 369
(1908); Prosser, Torts § 46, at 249 (2d ed. 1955). But see Miles v. Southeast-
ern Motor Truck Lines, Inc., 295 Ky. 156, 169, 172 S.W.2d 990, 997 (1943),
where the court stated: "[Ilt appears that the measure of damages in actions
for contribution and indemnity are the same with the exception, however, that
in an action for contribution the plaintiff admits that he was partly in fault for
[sio] accident and may recover only one-half of his liability to third parties,
while in a suit for indemnity the plaintiff denies any negligence on his part
and may recover the full amount oflhis liability to third parties."
6Prosser, Torts § 46, at 249 (2d ed. 1955); see also Oberst, "Recent De-
velopments in Torts; Decisions of the Court of Appeals at the 1956-57 Terms,"
46 Ky. L. J. 193, 214 (1958).7 Prosser, Torts § 46, at 249 (2d ed. 1955).
8 Phelps v. Brown, 295 S.W.2d 804 (Ky. 1956).
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note is to examine the Kentucky cases for factors which will aid in
distinguishing the two actions..
The words "contribution" and "indemnity" are not always used
in their technical sense.9 For example, the rule has been stated that
indemnity would not be permitted at common law except where the
tortfeasors were not in equal fault;10 or that neither contribution nor
indemnity would be permitted except where the tortfeasors were not
in equal fault. 1 Since indemnity is the proper remedy where tort-
feasors are not in equal fault,12 these statements are comparable to
saying that indemnity will not be permitted except where indemnity
will be permittedl The distinction was pointed up accurately in Mid-
dlesboro Home Telephone Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co.:13
The difficulty in determining the cases in which recovery over may
be had and those in which it will be denied grows out of the mis-
conceived ideas expressed in some of the opinions that the rule
is general that, as between tortfeasors, recovery over will not be
allowed, and that all cases in which it has been allowed are ex-
ceptions to the general rule. The general rule is that recovery over
as between wrongdoers may not be had where they are in pari
delicto.... The cases which have permitted recovery over have not
been exceptions to the general rule, but have done so because they
do not measure up to the rule which forbids recovery over; that
is, the parties are found not to be in pari delicto.14
The situation at common law was, then, that indemnity would be
permitted between joint torifeasors, but contribution would not be
permitted.
Since contribution was not permitted between joint tortfeasors,
the injured plaintiff, as a practical matter, determined which tort-
feasor would stand the ultimate loss. For example, if he recovered
a joint judgment, he could execute the entire judgment against either
tortfeasor. The choice could be made on the basis of the avail-
9 For example, see Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Beaucond, 188 Ky. 725,
741, 224 S.W. 179, 186 (1920) where the court said:
If the right of contribution exists between the tortfeasors, when
such one has satisfied the judgment, he may proceed aganist the
others, whose negligence, concurring with his, caused the injury,
for indemnity. If the right of contribution does not exist between
the torifeasors in the particular case, one cannot secure indemnity
from the others whose negligence concurred with his in causing the
injuries, although he is compelled to satisfy the entire damages.
This failure to distinguish properly the two actions probably accounts for the
statement in Miles v. Southeastern Motor Truck Lines, Inc., set out in note 5,
supra.
10 See City of Georgetown v. Groff, 136 Ky. 662, 124 S.W. 888 (1910).
11 Owensboro City 1R. Co. v. L6uisville, H. & St. L. fy., 165 Ky. 683, 178
S.W. 1043 (1915).
2 Brown Hotel Co. v. Pittsburgh Fuel Co., 311 Ky. 396, 224 S.W. 2d
165 (1949).
'3214 Ky. 822, 284 S.W. 104 (1926).
1- Id. at 827, 284 S.W. at 106.
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ability of insurance coverage, the comparative wealth of the joint
tortfeasors, or mere spite.15 The Kentucky court freely admitted that
as between the joint tortfeasors, injustice might arise,16 but this in-
justice was thought to be overcome by the strong public policy
against judicial balancing of equities between wrongdoers:
It is an anomalous if not unprecedented thing for a litigant, who
is a confessed wrongdoer, to come into court and set up the fact
that its own wrongful act, concurring with that of another, has
destroyed human life, and ask the court to adjust the equities
between it and the other wrongdoer.17
Despite this strong public policy, the common law was changed by
statute in 1926 to permit contribution in favor of a merely negligent
tortfeasor.'8 The rule as respects indemnity was not affected.19
Consequently, recovery is now permitted between joint tortfeasors
in all situations except where the one seeking it was guilty of an
intentional tort or some act of moral turpitude. Whether indemnity
will be permitted or whether the complaining tortfeasor will be
restricted to contribution depends, broadly speaking, on whether
the joint tortfeasors were in equal fault.
Contribution is the proper remedy where the tortfeasors were in
equal fault;20 indemnity is the proper remedy where the tortfeasors
were not in equal fault.21 Equal fault, as used in this context, does
not necessarily mean that each party is equally negligent. Nor does
15 For the view that such procedure is valuable as an efficient means of
distributnig losses through society, see James, "Contribution Among Joint Tort-
feasors: A Progmatic Criticism," 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1156 (1941); James, "In-
demnity, Subrogation, and Contribution and the Efficient Distribution of Accident
Losses," 21 NACCA L. J. 360 (1958). For the view that such procedure lacks
sense and justice, see Prosser, Torts § 46, at 248 (2d ed. 1955).
16 Owesboro City R.R. v. Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry., 165 Ky. 683, 689,
178 S.W. 1043, 1046 (1915).
17 City of Louisville v. Louisville By. Co., 156 Ky. 141, 148, 160 S.W. 771,
775 (1913).
'8 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 412.030 provides: "Contrbiution among wrongdoers may
be enforced where the wrong is a mere act of negligence and involves no moral
turpitude." See Louisville Ry. v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 256 Ky.
827, 77 S.W.2d 36 (1934); Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Burge, 245 Ky. 631,
54 S.W.2d 16 (1932).
19 Brown Hotel Co. v. Pittsburgh Fuel Co., 311 Ky. 396, 224 S.W.2d 165
(1949); Louisville By. v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., supra note 18.2 0 Louisville Ry. v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., supra note 18. But see
the statement in Gish Realty Co. v. Central City, 260 S.W.2d 946, 950 (Ky.
1953) where the court said: "[Wlhere the joint tortfeasors are equally at fault,
there may be no contribution ... " This is undoubtedly another example of a
situation where contribution is used in a non-technical sense to mean indemnity.
See note 9 supra and accompanying discussion.
21 See Brown Hotel Co. v. Pittsburgh Fuel Co., 311 Ky. 396, 224 S.W.2d
165 (1949); Middlesboro Home Tel. Co. v. Louisville & N. R.R., 214 Ky. 822,
284 S.W. 104 (1926); City of Georgetown v. Groff, 136 Ky. 662, 124 S.W. 888
(1910).
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it mean that they have committed identical negligent acts, caused
the same amount of damage, nor even that their negligent acts were
committed at the same time.22 It simply means that each torifeasor
was guilty of negligence of the same quality or degree that con-
curred in producing injury to a third party.23 Joint torfeasors are
held not to be in equal fault where one was secondarily liable while
the other was primarily liable;24 or where one was passively negli-
gent while the other was actively negligent.25 The primary-secondary
liability theory may be illustrated by the comparison of two cases.
In City of Louisville v. Louisville Ry.,26 the city permitted its streets
to become defective. A traveler, because of these defects, was thrown
from his wagon in front of a negligently driven streetcar which struck
him. The city paid a judgment rendered against it and sued the
railway company for indemnity, which was denied on the ground
that the parties were in equal fault. In City of Louisville v. Metro-
politan Realty Co.,2 7 a pedestrian stumbled over an obstruction placed
on the sidewalk by a contractor. The city paid a judgment rendered
against it and brought action against the contractor for indemnity,
which was permitted on the ground that the parties were not in
equal fault since the city was only secondarily liable while the con-
tractor was primarily liable to the injured party. In such cases the
city has the primary duty to keep its streets in repair,28 but only the
secondary duty to remove any obstructions that have been created
by others.29 In the Louisville Ry. case, the city was primarily liable
since it violated its duty to keep the streets in repair; in the Met-
ropolitan case, the city was secondarily liable because it failed to
discover and remove a defect that had been created by another.
22See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Louisville Bridge Co., 171 Ky. 445, 188 S.W.
476 (1916); Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Mayfield Water & Light Co., 166
Ky. 429, 179 S.W. 388 (1915); Owensboro City R.R. v. Louisville, H. & St. L.
Ry., 165 Ky. 683, 178 S.W. 1043 (1915); City of Louisville v. Louisville Ry.,
156 Ky. 141, 160 S.W. 771 (1913).
23 See Campbellsville Lumber Co. v. Lawrence, 268 S.W.2d 655 (Ky.
1954); Louisville By. v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 256 Ky. 827, 77 S.W.
2d 36 (1934).24 Parker v. Stewart, 296 Ky. 48, 176 S.W.2d 88 (1943) (dictum); City of
Louisville v. Metropolitan Realty Co., 168 Ky. 204, 182 S.W. 172 (1916); City
of Georgetown v. Cantrill, 158 Ky. 378, 164 S.W. 929 (1914); Blocker v. City
of Owensboro, 129 Ky. 75, 110 S.W. 369 (1908).25 Brown Hotel Co. v. Pittsburgh Fuel Co., 311 Ky. 396, 224 S.W.2d 165
(1949).28156 Ky. 141, 160 S.W. 771 (1913).
27 168 Ky. 204, 182 S.W. 172 (1916).28 City of Ashland v. Vansant Kitchen Lumber Co., 213 Ky. 518, 281 S.W.
503 (1926); City of Louisville v. Louisville By., 156 Ky. 141, 160 S.W. 771
(1913).
29 City of Ashland v. Vansant Kitchen Lumber Co., supra note 28; City of
Louisville v. Metropolitan Realty Co., 168 Ky. 204, 182 S.W. 172 (1916).
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The active-passive negligence theory may be best illustrated
by the case of Owensboro City R.R. v. Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry.30
There, Owensboro had contracted with Louisville to maintain a trol-
ley wire at a safe height above the railroad tracks. Employees of
Louisville broke a trolley wire that had been permitted to sag too
low, injuring a pedestrian. Judgments of $500 against Owensboro
and $1500 against Louisville were satisfied and Louisville brought
suit against Owensboro for indemnity. Its claim was denied on the
ground that it was an active participant in the wrong. Thus far the
case is consistent with other cases on the point, but the court went
on to say:
In the case at bar, if the wire, while sagged, had been innocently
broken by a railroad servant or a stranger, to the injury of himself
or others, and recovery had been against the railroad, although its
negligence consisted in mere inattention, then there would then be
reason in its claim for indemnity, and closer analogy to the Pullman
case, because the railroad and its servants would then be guilty of
no conscious or active wrongdoing, and the primary duty to main-
tain the wire was on the street car company. But here it is made
to appear that the raliroad, through its servants, was an active par-
ticipant in the wrong, and it knew, or from the circumstances is in
the iaw presumed to have known, that its wrong not only en-
dangered the property of the street car company, but human life.3 '
[Emphasis added.]
This dictum would suggest that, if the court uses conscious wrong-
doing and active wrongdoing synonymously, whether indemnity will
be permitted depends on whether the party seeking it was merely
negligent or guilty of conscious wrongdoing. The cases simply do
not bear out this proposition; mere negligence is sufficient to pre-
clude the action of indemnity.3 2 The Pullman case33 is not a proper
analogy to the hypothetical situation. In that case, the railroad com-
pany bought a gondola car that had a defective brake handle from
the Pullman company. An employee of the railroad company was
injured and recovered a judgment against the railroad company. It
was held that the railroad company might have indemnity against
the Pullman company. Thus, the Pullman case is simply one where
the party seeking indemnity was guilty of mere failure to discover
a dangerous condition that was created by the other party. In the
30 Owensboro City R.R. v. Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry., 165 Ky. 683, 178
S.W. 1043 (1915).
31 Id. at 696, 178 S.W. at 1049.32 See Ambrosius Industries v. Adams, 293 S.W.2d 230 (Ky. 1956); United
States Casualty Co. v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry., 218 Ky. 455, 291 S.W.
709 (1927); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Louisville Bridge Co., 171 Ky. 445, 188 S.W.
476 (1916). Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Mayfield Water & Light Co., 166




Owensboro City R. R. case, the railroad not only failed to discover
the sagging wire, its employees actually broke it.
Actually the two theories tend to combine into one, as illustrated
by Brown Hotel Co. v. Pittsburgh Fuel Co.34 There an employee of
Pittsburgh left a manhole cover insecure on Brown's property. A
pedestrian stepped on the insecure lid and was injured. He received
separate judgments against Brown and Pittsburgh. Both judgments
were satisfied and Brown sued Pittsburgh for indemnity, which was
permitted on the ground that Brown was guilty of a negative tort
while Pittsburgh's negligence was the primary, active cause of the
pedestrian's injuries. This case presents basically the same situation
that is posed in the municipality cases where the primary-secondary
liability theory is used.
A look at some of the cases will show that there is a better way
to solve the problem of whether contribution or indemnity is the
proper action. Indemnity was not permitted between the following
joint torifeasors:
(1) A city and a streetcar company, where the city permitted its
streets to get in a defective condition causing a traveler to be thrown
in front of a negligently driven streetcar;33
(2) A railroad company and a streetcar company, where a pedes-
trian was injured when employees of the railroad company broke a
trolley wire that the streetcar company had permitted to "sag low;"3 6
(3) A telephone company and an electric company, where the
electric company did not insulate its wires and the telephone com-
pany placed its wires too close to the electric wires, causing the
death of a telephone company employee who came in contact with
the electric wire;37
(4) A bridge company and a railroad company, where an em-
ployee of the railroad company put a trespasser off its train and the
trespasser stepped into an unguarded frog on the bridge and his leg
was cut off by an approaching train;38
(5) A transfer company and a streetcar company, where the
transfer truck left on the streetcar tracks was hit by an approaching
streetcar, injuring a person about to board the streetcar;39
34 11 Ky. 396, 224 S.W.2d 165 (1949).
35 City of Louisville v. Louisville By., 156 Ky. 141, 160 S.W. 771 (1913).3 6 Owensboro City R.R. v. Louisville, H. & Et L. Ry., 165 Ky. 683, 178
S.W. 1043 (1915).3 7 Cumberland Tel & Tel. Co. v. Mayfield Water & Light Co., 166 Ky. 429,
179 S.W. 388 (1915).
38 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Louisville Bridge Co., 171 Ky. 445, 188 S.W. 476




(6) Two railroad companies, where an employee of one negli-
gently sold tickets for an incorrect destination and an employee of
the other wrongfully put them off its train.40
On the other hand, indemnity has been permitted between the
following joint tortfeasors:
(7) A city and a contractor, where the city failed to discover an
obstruction, placed in its street by the contractor, that caused injury
to a pedestrian.4'
(8) A hotel company and a fuel company, where the hotel com-
pany failed to discover an insecure manhole cover that had been
left in that condition by an employee of the fuel company;42
(9) A railroad company and a manufacturer of railroad cars,
where the railroad company failed to find a defect in one of the man-
ufacturer's cars which caused injury to an employee of the railroad
company;43
(10) An employer and employee, where the employer was liable
for the injuries of a customer solely because of the employer-em-
ployee relationship;44
(11) A railroad company and a telephone company, where the
telephone company permitted its cable to sag low, causing injury
to an employee of the railroad company stationed on top of a rail-
road car.45
Thus, in each of the cases in which indemnity was denied, the
party seeking it had committed some negligent act of his own which
was separate from the wrongful act of his co-tortfeasor. He had
either aided in creating the dangerous condition (examples 1, 3, 4,
5, 6 supra or committed the last act in the chain of causation (ex-
ample 2 supra). In each of the cases in which indemnity was per-
mitted the party seeking it was held liable to the injured party be-
cause of either (1) his failure to discover a dangerous condition that
had been created by another (examples 7, 8, 9 supra). So, rather than
40 Louisville & N. R.R. v. Southern Ry., 237 Ky. 618, 86 S.W.2d 20 (1931).
41 City of Louisville v. Metropolitan Realty Co., 168 Ky. 204, 182 S.W.
172 (1916). For other municipality cases, see City of Louisville v. Nicholls, 158
Ky. 516, 165 S.W. 660 (1914); Board of Councilmen of City of Harrodsburg
v. Vanardsdall, 148 Ky. 507, 147 S.W. 1 (1912); Robertson v. City of Paducah,
146 Ky. 188, 142 S.W. 370 (1912).42 Brown Hotel Co. v. Pittsburgh Fuel Co., 311 Ky. 396, 224 S.W.2d 165
(1949).43 Pullman Co. v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.R. R.R., 147 Ky. 498, 144 S.W. 385
(1912).
44Phelps v. Brown, 295 S.W.2d 804 (Ky. 1956) (dictum). Although this
was an obvious case for indemnity, plaintiff, for practical reasons brought con-
tribution. See also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Roper, 243 Ky. 811, 50 S.W.2d 8 (1932);




speak in terms that imply a comparison of the negligence of two
defendants, it may be that the best approach would be to determine
whether the party against whom indemnity is being asserted not
only breached a duty to the injured plaintiff, but to his co-defendant
as well. As stated by Professor Hodges in the Texas Law Reviews
When there are two tortfeasors, either or both of whom are liable
to an injured third person, but one of whom has breached a duty
which he owed both to his co-tortfeasor and to the injured third
person, then the tortfeasor who, to his co-tortfeasor, is blameless,
should be allowed indemnity.46
This approach would permit the court to state the true basis for its
decision without using the rather nebulous phrases that have already
caused much confusion. For example, in the Owensboro City R. R.
case, where the railway company was attempting to recovery in
indemnity, the court would determine whether the streetcar company
had breached a duty owed the railroad company. Undoubtedly it
did by failing to maintain the wire at the proper height. But was the
railroad company blameless so as to permit indemnity in its favor?
No, since it also breached a duty it owed the streetcar company:
[I]t knew, or from the circumstances is in the law presumed to
have known, that its wrong . . . endangered the property of the
streetcar company. .... 47
On the other hand, in a situation where a city fails to discover an
obstruction that has been placed in its streets which causes injury
to another, indemnity would be permitted. There, the actual wrong-
doer has breached a duty it owes the city, while it is clear that the
city has breached no duty to the wrongdoer.
EFmcr oF =mE NENw RuLEs
The Kentucky Civil Code of Practice did not permit cross-actions
between defendants. 48 Consequently, a judgment against co-defend-
ants was not necessarily res judicata as respects their rights and lia-
bilities toward each other, even though each defendant had argued in
the main action that the other was solely at fault.40 In fact, it was
a condition precedent to bringing the action of contribution or in-
demnity that the party seeking it had satisfied the injured party's
46 Hodges, supra note 2, at 162.
47 Owensboro City R.R. v. Louisville, H. & St. Ry., 165 Ky. 688, 696, 178
S.W. 1048, 1049 (1915).48 See, e.g., Clark's Adm'x v .Rucker, 258 S.W.2d 9, 10 (Ky. 1953).
49 Clark's Admx v. Rucker, supra note 48; see also cases cited in notes
41-45 supra. Accord where a directed verdict was given in the original action in
favor of the indemnitor: Pullman Co. v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. R.R., 147 Ky.
498, 144 S.W. 885 (1912).
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claim against himself by either (1) effecting a good-faith settlement
in pursuance of compromise or (2) paying a judgment rendered in
a prior action.49a Thus, in Brown Hotel Co. v. Pittsburgh Fuel Co.,50
Brown and Pittsburgh had been joined in the main action, in which
each had argued that the other was solely at fault. The case went
to the jury under instructions which would permit the jury to find
for or against both defendants, or for one and against the other.
Equal verdicts were returned and the judgments rendered thereon
were satisfied. Brown then sued Pittsburgh for indemnity which was
permitted, the court holding that the prior judgment was not res
judicata between the defendants since they were not adversaries.
Such parties are adversaries only in a "colloquial sense";51 a former
judgment is res judicata only where the subsequent litigation is be-
tween parties to the former judgment whose interests were adverse
in the sense that they were on opposite sides according to the plead-
ings. 52 And, since cross-actions were not permitted, defendants could
be adversaries only in special circumstances.63
Cross-actions are expressly permitted by the Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure.54 The first case to give an indication of the effect
49aHargis v. Noel, 310 Ky. 542, 221 S.W.2d 94 (1949); Consolidated
Coach Corp v. Burge, 245 Ky. 631, 54 S.W.2d 16 (1932); City of Georgetown
v. Groff, 136 Ky. 662, 124 S.W. 888 (1910); Annot., 85 A.L.R. 1091 (1933).
50 311 Ky. 396, 224 S.W.2d 165 (1949).
51 Clark's Adm'x v. Rucker, 258 S.W.2d 9, 10 (Ky. 1953).
52 Ibid.
5 Such special circumstances occurred in Vaughn's Adm'r v. Louis-
ville & N. R.R., 297 Ky. 309, 779 S.W.2d 441 (1944). There, Robert Vaughn,
Jr., while driving a truck used in the business of Mattie, Elizabeth and
Robert Vaughn, Sr., collided with a train, killing himself and two com-
panions. Personal representatives of the companions brought wrongul death
actions against the Vaughns and the railroad company. The Vaughns filed
a motion stating that their interests and the interests of the railroad were
antagonistic and that their defenses were wholly inconsistent with the railroad
company and moved the court to impanel a jury of 21 persons to that each
set of defendants might have 3 peremptory challenges. The motion was
granted, the case went to trial, and verdicts and judgments of $400 against
the Vaughns and $2500 against the railroad company were returned. The
Vaughns satisfied the judgment and Robert Vaughn, Sr., as personal rep-
resentative of Robert Vaughn, Jr., brought an action against the railroad
company for the wrongful death of Robert Vaughn, Jr. In dismissing the ac-
tion, the court said:
As a general rule res judicata can be invoked only where the subse-
quent litigation is between the parties to the former judgment or
their privies, and where their interests are adverse in the prior
proceedings. This does not mean that they must have been plaintiff
and defendant, respectively, but it is sufficient if they were assert-
ing adverse interests, as here. . . 297 Ky. at , 179 S.W.2d at
444. See also Annot., 152 A.L.R. 1066 (1944).54 Ky. R. Civ. P. 13.07 provides:
A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party against
a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim
therein or relating to any property that is the subject matter of
the original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the
[Vol. 48,
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of the rules on contribution and indemnity actions was Gish Realty
Co. v. Central City,55 a case that was practiced under the Federal
Rules. There, Central City and Gish were joined as defendants in
the main action and each filed cross-claims, alleging the sole negli-
gence of the other. The case went to the jury under instructions sim-
ilar to those given in the Brown Hotel case, permitting a finding
for or against either or both defendants. Separate verdicts were re-
turned of $8,000 against the city and $4,000 against Gish. Judgment
was rendered on the verdicts and the city moved to dismiss its
cross-claim, which was permitted without prejudice. Then the city
satisfied the $8,000 judgment against it and sued Gish for indemnity,
which was denied on the ground that the original judgment was res
judicata. The Court distinguished Gish from Brown Hotel on the
ground that Gish was practiced under the new rules. But, as noted
in the dissent, since the trial court did not rule on the cross-claim, the
effect should have been the same as if the case had been tried under
the code:
That the failure to . .. [rule on the cross-claim] was no mere over-
sight is evidenced by the fact that the Federal Court subsequently
dismissed the cross-claim on the City's motion, specifically reciting
by its order that the dismissal was "without prejudice to any further
claim or action by the City of Central City, Kentucky, against the
Gish Realty Company." 56
The rules should not be interpreted as giving the jury verdict more
weight than before. The court is not compelled to rule on the cross-
claim; it may under CR 42.0257 hold a separate trial of the cross-
claim in furtherance of convenience and to avoid prejudice. How-
ever, the court apparently gave some weight to the fact that the jury
rendered separate verdicts against the defendants, the largest of which
was against Central City. It said:
[I]f one party's fault is the lesser, he may recover from the more
culpable. In the instant case, if the verdict is given any force, be-
party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-
claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against
the cross-claimant. [Emphasis added.]
5 260 S.W.2d 946 (Ky. 1953). Since Kentucky's Rules are identical to
the Federal Rules insofar as those applicable to the Gish case are concerned,
it is safe to assume that they will be interpreted accordingly by the Kentucky
court.56 Id. at 952.57 Ky. R. Civ. P. 42.02, identical to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), provides:
If the court determines that separate trials will be in furtherance
of convenience or will avoid prejudice it shall order a separate trial
of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of
any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counter-
claims, third-party claims, or issues.
1960]
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fore indemnity may be had, it would be necessary to extend that
rule and say the one in the greater fault could recover from the
one who is guilty of the lesser wrongdoing.58 [Emphasis added.]
But, as pointed out above,s"a fault is not synonymous with negligence.
A party may be negligent and still recover from a co-defendant, pro-
vided their negligence was of a different degree or quality. A jury,
in the absence of an issue joined between the defendants, simply
determines whether the defendants were both negligent, not the de-
gree or quality of the negligence. Had Brown Hotel been handled
as Gish was handled, indemnity would have been denied, since the
equal verdicts rendered in Brown Hotel would have meant that the
parties were in equal fault.59
In Ambrosius Industries v. Adams,60 verdicts of $25,000 against
Holloway and $50,000 against Ambrosius were returned. Holloway
had filed a cross-claim for indemnity against Ambrosius but the court
did not instruct on it. The Court of Appeals held that this failure
to rule on the cross-claim was a peremptory instruction and that the
cross-claim was properly denied since Holloway's negligence was a
concurring cause as a matter of law. This decision, then, is a routine
example of the manner in which the issues between all the parties
may, under the rules, be settled in one suit. A more difficult ques-
tion would have been presented, however, if Ambrosius had cross-
claimed against Holloway for contribution. 1 In other words, if
Ambrosius had cross-claimed for contribution and the jury had re-
turned a verdict of $25,000 against Holloway and $50,000 against
Ambrosius, would the court have ruled as a matter of law that Am-
brosius was entitled to contribution of $12,500? A proper consider-
ation of this question requires a look at a related matter, i.e., the
power of the jury to apportion damages between defendants.
The jury is permitted, by statute, to apportion the damages be-
tween defendants according to culpability. 2 Thus, a jury may com-
pare the negligence of the two defendants and award damages
against them without regard to the amount of actual damage caused
58 Gish Realty Co. v. Central City, 260 S.W.2d 946, 950 (Ky. 1953).
5sa See note 23 supra.
59 See cases cited in notes 35-40 supra.
60293 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1956).
61 Oberst, "Recent Developments in Torts; Decisions of the Court of Appeals
at the 1956-57 Terms," 46 Ky. L. J. 193, 214 (1958).
62Ky. Rev. Stat § 454.040 (1959), provides:
In actions of trespass the jury may assess joint or several damages
against the defendants. When the jury finds several damages, thejudgment shall be in favor of the plaintiff against each defendant
for the several damages, without regard to the amount of damages
claimed in the petition, and shall include a joint judgment for the
costs.
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by each. 3 The statute which authorizes contribution does not set up
the measure of damages, 64 in contribution actions is the amount of
the settlement or judgment divided by the number of tortfeasors.65
Once the defendant in the contribution action is shown to have
been negligent in the same quality or degree as the plaintiff, his
liability to the plaintiff is fixed at his prorated share of the amount
that the plaintiff has been forced to expend in satisfying the injured
party's claim against himself.
It is clear, of course, that to permit contribution after separate
verdicts were returned would nullify the statute permitting the jury
to apportion damages. However, there is no case which has given
this rationalization. In fact the only case that seems to be in point
on the issue of whether contribution will be permitted after separate
verdicts is Vaughn's Admr v. Louisville & N. R. R. 6 There, separate
verdicts had been returned against the parties in the main action.
Vaughn then sued the railroad in a wrongful death action which grew
out of the same transaction. The railroad's counterclaim for contri-
bution was dismissed. The court upheld this dismissal with summary
discussion:
Whatever may have been the rights of the parties in the first action,
the question of contribution was there determined and the judgment
against the respective defendants were satisfied. The railroad com-
pany cannot now, in this independent action, ask for additional
contribution from its co-defendants in the first action. 67
However, it is to be noted that the court felt that because of the
peculiar type of practice68 permitted in that case the parties were ad-
verse in the original action.
Nevertheless, there is strong dictum in Brown Hotel Co. v. Pitts-
burgh Fuel Co.69 which indicates that separate verdicts do not pre-
clude the subsequent action of contribution. In that case, indemnity
was permitted after separate verdicts had been given in a former
case, the court saying:
We hold, in accord with the great weight of authority . . . that
a judgment against codefendants is not conclusive as between them-
selves with respect to their rights and liabilities toward each other
63Murphy v. Taxicabs of Louisville, Inc., 330 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1959);
McCulloch's Admr v. Abell's Adm'r, 272 Ky. 756, 115 S.W.2d 386 (1938).
Of course, the plaintiff's total award is determined by the actual damages suf-
fered by the wrongful acts of the defendants. See Louisville & N. R.R. v. Roth,
130 Ky. 759, 114 S.W. 264 (1908).
64 See statute set out in note 18 supra.
65 See cases cited in note 4 supra.
66297 Ky. 809, 179 S.W.2d 441 (1944).
67 Id. at 817, 179 S.W.2d at 445.
68 See comment in note 58 supra.
69311 Ky. 396, 224 S.W.2d 165 (1949).
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unless an issue was made between them or the parties in the second
action were adversary parties in the first action. . . . This is so
because the judgment established nothing but the joint liability to
the person injured. The relative rights of the codefendants inter
se were not litigated, and the question as to which should bear the
entire cost of a wrongful act or what proportion each should pay
remains undecided or not adjudicated.70 [Emphasis added.]
This dictum would suggest that a jury's verdict only establishes the
joint liability of the defendants and that, unless a judgment is rend-
ered on a verdict where the parties were adversaries, the rights and
liabilities of the parties toward each other are not determined. Con-
sequently, in the problem raised in connection with the Ambrosius
case, the court could, under existing law, equalize the burden be-
tween the tortfeasors even though it would mean that the effect of
the statute permitting apportionment would be nullified. As profes-
sor Oberst has suggested,71 a statute in this field would be helpful.
The legislature could clarify the situation by amending the contri-
bution statute to provide a method of determining damages between
the tortfeasors that would be compatible with the apportionment
statute.
Billy R. Paxton
70d. at 402, 224 S.W.2d at 168; See Annot., 101 A.L.R. 104 (1936).
71 Oberst, supra note 61, at 214.
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